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Abstract 
Suggestibility is regarded as a major issue when children testify in court.  Many legal 
professionals and memory researchers view children as inferior witnesses. Although 
differences exist between children and adults in suggestibility, these are much more complex 
than is usually assumed. We show that under certain conditions, adults are more susceptible 
to suggestion and false memories than children.  We demonstrate that age-related shifts in 
suggestibility and false memory appear contingent on how fast and automatic children and 
adults make associations when experiencing events. Specifically, when confronted with 
suggestive information about a related, but non-experienced detail, adults more frequently 
than children, automatically generate links between items experienced and those already in 
memory making them more susceptible to suggestion than children. 
 
Keywords: Suggestibility; Development; False Memory; Developmental Reversal; 
Associative Activation. 
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Who is the Better Eyewitness?  
Adults and Children 
Many child development textbooks suggest that children underperform on most, if not 
all, tasks related to cognition (Bjorklund & Causey, 2017). Textbooks on developmental 
psychology regularly stress that the ability to plan and inhibit improves with age (Zelazo et 
al., 2003).  In the current article, we focus on the development of memory.  Here, the critical 
assumption is that children’s memory is generally inferior to that of adults.  One practical 
issue discussed in this context is that when suggestive interviews are used (e.g., by the 
police), children are more likely to accept these suggestions than adults.  This topic bears 
relevance to the legal field where children are regularly viewed as inferior witnesses and 
special care is devoted to interview children in a correct manner (Bruer & Pozzulo, 2014).  
Such a perspective is also shared among some memory researchers.  For example, 
Volpini, Melis, Petralia, and Rosenberg (2016) recently echoed this by stating that “younger 
children are almost always more susceptible to suggestibility” (p.104).  Likewise, Kassin et 
al. (2001) found that the majority of psychologists with legal experiences agreed that young 
children are more vulnerable to suggestion than adults.  Are these views etched in scientific 
stone? We doubt this. We review literature showing that age-related shifts in suggestibility 
are variable but do conform to certain theoretical principles.  Thus, under certain well-
specified conditions, adults might be even more prone to suggestive interviewing techniques 
than children.  
A Short History  
Around 1903-1904,  the German psychologist William Stern commented on the 
reliability of children’s testimony (Sporer, 1982).  He reported on a case in which statements 
of a young boy were likely influenced by suggestive pressure and advised that these 
statements should be discarded.  Around 1910, the Belgian psychologist Johan Varendonck 
(Whipple, 1913) stressed that suggestive questions might have adversely affected statements 
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of two young child witnesses. The American professor Guy Whipple wrote the first reviews 
on the reliability of children’s memory (Whipple, 1909, 1911).  His key argument was that 
children’s memories were inherently unreliable even when pertaining to autobiographical 
experiences.  This focus on the unreliability of children’s memory even led to bizarre 
statements such as the one by the founding father of legal psychology, Hugo Münsterberg 
(1908), who wrote that “Experiments with school children, especially, seem to show that the 
girls have a better memory than the boys as far as omissions are concerned; they forget less. 
But they have a worse memory than the boys as far as correctness is concerned: they 
unintentionally falsify more” (p.54).  Thus,  already at the start of psychology as an academic 
discipline, children were regarded as inferior witnesses. 
Scientific interest in the reliability of children’s memory increased exponentially in 
the 1980s and 1990s because of several high profile daycare abuse cases in different 
countries such as the United States.  In these cases, many children reported having been 
abused by the same person or persons.  One notorious example was the McMartin preschool 
in which hundreds of children allegedly remembered having been sexually abused by three 
teachers at their preschool.  However, the children reporting these allegations were subjected 
to suggestive interviews, ones that likely affected their recall, leading inexorably to erroneous 
recollections (Garven, Wood, Malpass, & Shaw 1998).  Discussions surrounding these 
daycare abuse cases reinforced the idea of children’s memory as exceptionally prone to 
suggestive pressure and false memories.  Subsequently, studies have looked into children’s 
vulnerability to suggestion and false memory. Prima facie, the bulk of these studies seemed 
to confirm the idea that children are poor witnesses.  
Children Are Most Suggestible 
Cases such as the McMartin preschool case contained various interviewing techniques 
that likely contaminated children’s testimonies (e.g., suggestive questions, inviting 
speculation). There is much research attempting to mimic these circumstances and their 
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effects on memory (Garven et al., 1998; Schreiber, Wentura, & Bilsky, 2001). However, for 
the current purpose, we have specifically focused on developmental research using various 
sorts of suggestive manipulations (i.e., presenting misinformation on details and events). If 
we home in on false memory, myriad studies exist showing that suggestion is more likely to 
infect younger children’s than older children’s and adults’ memory.  In a pioneering study by 
Ceci, Ross, and Toglia (1987), 3- to 12-year-old children were read a story about a girl on her 
first day at school.  Children received information that the girl had a stomach ache.  One day 
later, some children were presented with misinformation implying that the little girl had a 
headache. Specifically, these children were interviewed and asked whether they could 
remember the story about the headache. Two days later, all children received a recognition 
test.  The youngest children (3- to 4-year-olds) most often accepted the suggestion. 
This pattern has been replicated many times (e.g., Kulkofsky & Klemfuss, 2008; 
Roebers & Schneider, 2005).  In one of our own experiments, 4- to 5-year-olds and 8- to 11-
year-olds had to remove three pieces of clothing from a puppet (Otgaar, Candel, Smeets, & 
Merckelbach, 2010).  Half of the children were also presented with false evidence suggesting 
that they had removed one extra piece of clothing. Specifically, without children seeing it, a 
confederate removed one extra piece of clothing after which it was suggested to the children 
that they removed four pieces of clothing. During three follow-up interviews with 1-week 
intervals, children had to report which pieces of clothing they had taken off.  Four- to 5-year-
olds were more likely to falsely report that they took off four pieces of clothing than 8- to 11-
year old children.  
Some studies have used a false memory implantation paradigm to examine whether 
children can create what has been termed rich false memories (e.g., Loftus, 2005; Otgaar, 
Smeets, & Peters, 2012).  In contrast to typical misinformation experiments, in false memory 
implantation studies, participants are not presented with stimuli and then receive 
misinformation about these stimuli afterwards. Here, participants are immediately exposed to 
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suggestive false narratives implying that they experienced a fictitious event. For current 
discussions concerning developmental trajectories in suggestibility, developmental studies 
using this paradigm are relevant because they shed light on children’s willingness to 
acquiesce to external suggestions.  We falsely suggested to 7- to 8- and 11- to 12-year-olds 
that they were abducted by a UFO or that they almost choked on a candy when they were 4 
years old (Otgaar, Candel, Merckelbach, & Wade, 2009).  False memory rates for both events 
were statistically higher in younger (7/8-year-old) than older (11/12-year-old) children.  A 
similar pattern emerged in a study (Otgaar, Candel, Scoboria, & Merckelbach, 2010) in 
which children were fed false stories such as receiving a rectal enema or getting with their 
fingers stuck in a mousetrap: False events were more likely to be implanted in younger (7/8-
year-old) than older (11/12-year-old) children’s memory.  
The notion that (younger) children are especially sensitive to including suggestion in 
their memory reports is confirmed when we examine the available work that has been 
conducted in this area over the past few decades. If, for example, we consider all studies in 
which false suggestive information (i.e., misinformation) was presented to different age 
groups, then it is obvious that most of them observed an age-related decrease in susceptibility 
to suggestion-based false memory (see Figure 1 and Appendix A).  However, this is only one 
part of the story.  
Associative Activation, Mental Representations, and False Memory 
According to associative activation theory (AAT; Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & 
Plumpton, 2009) some false memories arise because of associative activation spreading 
through a dense network of interrelated nodes.  Essentially, AAT is a network model of 
memory where nodes (e.g., concepts, not simply words) are interconnected and are also 
linked to overarching themes (various meanings associated with the concepts).  AAT 
successfully predicts false memories (and their developmental trajectories from childhood 
through adulthood) not just in studies involving word lists, but also pictures (e.g., Howe, 
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2008), visual scenes (e.g., Lew & Howe, 2017), stories (e.g., Howe & Wilkinson, 2011), 
and autobiographical false memories (Otgaar et al., 2012).  It also predicts changes in false 
memory rates as a function of the emotional state of the individual and the material being 
remembered (e.g., Bland, Howe, & Knott, 2016; Knott, Howe, Toffalini, Shah, & 
Humphreys, in press). Thus, this theory is particularly well-suited to inform our 
understanding of developmental trends in children’s eyewitness remembering. 
For example, when experiencing an event (e.g., robbery), nodes related to that event, 
but not part of the current experience, may become activated (e.g., seeing a gun) and increase 
the likelihood of a false memory.  Throughout the course of life, people acquire more 
knowledge resulting in faster and more automatic associative activation.  The net effect of 
this is that under some conditions (i.e., when surrounded by associatively related cues), adults 
are more susceptible to false memory than children precisely because they are more likely to 
generate faulty associations.  
Thus, AAT assumes that under these conditions, false memory follows an age-related 
increase, which stands in contrast to the work on false memories induced by suggestion (see 
Figure 1; but see also below).  So, a specific form of false memory called spontaneous false 
memory is more likely to be evoked in adults relative to children.  Spontaneous false 
memories are purely caused by internal mechanisms such as associative activation and are 
not the result of external influences such as suggestive questions.  The principal procedure 
used to elicit spontaneous false memories is the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM; Deese, 
1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) paradigm.  In this paradigm, participants receive words 
(e.g., baker, dough, knife, flour) that are all associated with a non-presented word called the 
critical lure (i.e., bread). Studies have demonstrated that participants falsely recollect the 
critical lure at rates often indistinguishable from true memory rates (Roediger & McDermott, 
1995).  These false memories are more easily induced in adults than in children, a 
phenomenon termed developmental reversal (Brainerd et al., 2008).   
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Such reversal effects have not only been found with associative word lists. Other 
stimuli capturing associative relations have revealed developmental reversal effects as well. 
Lyons, Ghetti, and Cornoldi (2010) presented 6-, 7-, 9-, 10-year-olds, and adults with 
photographs depicting a common script (e.g., eating in a restaurant). A script refers to a 
knowledge structure containing interrelated details denoting the typical actions occurring 
during an event. The photographs included effects (e.g., wiping up water from a table) of 
non-presented causes (e.g., knocking over a glass of water). The authors found an age-related 
increase in participants falsely remembering having seen the cause in the originally presented 
photographs.  
The developmental reversal phenomenon indicates that adults more easily generate 
spontaneous false memories than children, whereas for false memories evoked by suggestion, 
the reverse is true.  However, recent work from our laboratory has revealed that 
developmental trends for both types of false memories are not always consistent.  For 
example, in one of our studies (Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Smeets, & Moritz, 2014), we presented 
children (7- to 8-year-olds and 11- to 12-year-olds) and adults with visual scenes (e.g., beach) 
containing associatively related details (e.g., sand, water). Some related details were left out 
(e.g., bath towel). These not-presented related items were often spontaneously and incorrectly 
remembered.  Furthermore, and contrary to the developmental reversal effect, children (7/8-
year-olds and 11/12-year-olds) were more likely to produce spontaneous false memories than 
adults when visual scenes were used.  The explanation for this is that according to Otgaar and 
colleagues (2014), the visual scenes helped children to distill the underlying theme. 
According to AAT, visual material may compensate for children’s lack of associative 
networks compared with adults. For children, this additional thematic assistance might make 
them more prone to false memory creation than adults. In fact, when we presented children 
and adults with videos to foster spontaneous false memory, we found the same.  Because the 
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theme of videos is readily identified, children rather than adults were most susceptible to 
spontaneous false memories (Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Sauerland, & Raymaekers, 2013).  
The variability of false memory development shows that developmental trends in 
false memories are not fixed and can follow a trajectory that is opposite to what one would 
expect. This is also what has been suggested by a developmental-representational account 
(Ceci, Fitneva, & Williams, 2010) which has parallels with AAT. According to this theory 
(and AAT as well), children’s background knowledge or mental representations about events 
drive developmental effects in suggestibility. That is, because young children have not 
acquired as much knowledge as older children and adults, they are less likely to relate 
external (misleading) information that is connected to that knowledge. Ceci and colleagues 
reasoned that these trends can be easily altered when considering someone’s knowledge base 
of an event.  
In one experiment, Ceci, Papierno, and Kulkofsky (2007) provided 4- and 9-year old 
children with 257 sets of three pictures and they had to decide in each set which picture did 
not belong with the other two. The goal of this similarity rating task was to map children’s 
representations and associations of these stimuli in order to later predict children’s proneness 
to suggestion. So, one to three months later, these children and other children of the same age 
groups listened to a story which was illustrated using pictures of objects from the first part of 
the experiment. After two days, some children received misinformation about the story. For 
example, in one story, a boy and a girl saw an eagle in the zoo, but received the false 
suggestion that they saw a robin. Five to seven days later, children received a memory test 
including pictures that had either been presented or served as the misleading stimuli. The 
most interesting result was that when stimuli (e.g., eagle and robin) were highly associated, 
they were more likely to be misremembered than when such association did not exist. 
Importantly, they found this effect irrespective of age when age-relevant similarity ratings 
were used. That is, older children were most susceptible to misinformation when stimuli were 
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highly related and drawn from their similarity ratings and so too were younger children 
when those related stimuli came from their similarity ratings. 
Children Are Least Suggestible 
 In many child (sexual) abuse cases, expert witnesses may tell triers of fact to be 
cautious with children’s reports as they might easily be infected by suggestion.  However, 
developmental trends in false memory can be altered.  Developmental reversal effects have 
been well documented in the area of spontaneous false memory.  Whether they also might 
occur with false memories elicited by suggestion has been a key question in our recent 
empirical work. Our prediction was that when children and adults are presented with stimuli 
containing associatively-related information and receive information suggesting that a related 
but not presented item was shown, adults, and not children, should be most susceptible to 
suggestion.  This prediction carries considerable ecological validity because when children 
and adults witness events that they then provide testimony about, the elements of the events 
tend to be highly interrelated. 
 Our counterintuitive prediction has been confirmed in a number of recent studies.  For 
example, in four experiments, children (4/6- (Experiments 2, 4) 6/9- (Experiments 1, 2, 3, 4) 
and 10/12-year-olds (Experiments 1, 2, 4)) and adults (Experiments 1, 3) were shown a video 
(e.g., bank robbery) containing associatively-related details (e.g., robber, vault; Otgaar, 
Howe, Brackmann, & Smeets, 2016).  Crucially, following this, in the first two experiments, 
they were presented with an eyewitness misinformation account falsely stating that, for 
example, a gun was present during the crime.  In the last two experiments, half of the 
children also received the same misinformation but now an interviewer provided the false 
suggestions.  Next, participants received a recognition test.  In all experiments, we found 
evidence for developmental reversal effects.  Specifically, in the first experiment, we found 
that adults and 11-year-olds had higher misinformation scores than 6/7-year-old children and 
in Experiment 3, we also showed that adults were more susceptible to misinformation 
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reporting than 7/8-year old children.  In Experiment 2, even younger children (4/6-year-
olds) were included and here, 10/12-year-olds produced more false memories than the 7/9- 
and 4/6-year-olds.  Similar findings were observed in the fourth experiment in which 11/12-
year-olds were more likely to produce false memories than 7/8-year-olds and 4/5-year-olds.  
What these studies suggest is that even very young children (i.e., 4-year-olds) can 
evince lower false memory rates than older children.  Why this is relevant is because 
previous research has shown that this younger age group of 4/5-year-olds are especially 
sensitive to external suggestions due to social factors such as accepting information from 
authority figures (e.g., Leichtman & Ceci, 1995).  Our results show that when misinformation 
is presented that is directly related to one’s knowledge base, even 4/5-year-olds can be the 
least prone to suggestion.  
 In another study (Otgaar, Howe, Brackmann, & van Helvoort, 2017), children (7- to 
8-year-olds and 11- to 12-year-olds) and adults viewed pictures (e.g., a desk) containing 
associatively-related details (e.g., books, laptop).  They viewed the stimuli in pairs believing 
they received the same pictures.  Each version of the picture included a critical item that was 
associatively related to the scene, but absent in the other picture version.  Following this, 
participants had to discuss and retrieve all details that they could still remember.  The idea 
behind this discussion is that participants would mention (suggest) details that while present 
in their pictures were absent in the pictures of the other participants.  After this, participants 
had to individually report everything they could still recollect. Again we found that children 
were not more susceptible to suggestion than adults at both recall moments.  In fact, they 
were equally susceptible to suggestion and when correcting for response bias, adults were 
even more prone to suggestion.  
 These findings counter the default view that suggestibility is a problem primarily for 
children. Under some conditions – namely those fostering associations – adults are just as, or 
even more, suggestible than children.  This perspective is not commonplace in the scientific 
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literature and although others have found adults to be more susceptible to memory errors 
than younger children (4- to 7-year-olds) as well (e.g., Kim, Kwon, & Ceci, 2017), this work 
has not focused on altering developmental trends in suggestibility, something that has been a 
major focus of our research (but see Ceci et al., 2007).      
False Memory Development in Court 
What these data show is that when suggestions involve associatively-related 
information (similar to that used to elicit spontaneous false memories), young children are 
less susceptible to these suggestions than older children and adults.  Because most eyewitness 
accounts involve information that is highly interrelated, our studies raise a crucial question: 
how might this more balanced idea of children’s susceptibility to false memory affect 
decisions in the legal arena?  It is a given fact that the science of memory plays a crucial role 
in child sexual abuse cases where children’s statements are often the only piece of evidence 
(Howe, Knott, & Conway, 2018; Otgaar & Howe, 2018).  However, and more pointedly, the 
key issue is whether the scientific findings reviewed here are relevant to legal cases where 
children’s memories serve as (the only) evidence. 
Consider the case in which the first author (HO) provided his expert opinion. It 
involved a 6-year-old child claiming to have seen her mother being stabbed to death by her 
father (Brackmann, Otgaar, Sauerland, & Jelicic, 2016).  HO was asked by the prosecution to 
write a report concerning the accuracy of the girl’s statement while a clinical psychologist 
was hired by the defense on the same matter. The clinical psychologist argued that the child 
spontaneously formed a false memory of the murder.  His reasoning was based on the default 
notion that children are exceptionally susceptible to false memories.  HO concluded that no 
signs of suggestion existed and that young children can be less likely to form spontaneous 
false memories.  The judge deemed the statement of the girl accurate enough to convict the 
father to 18 years of imprisonment.   
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One may contend that in many cases, it is not certain what details of an event are 
associated with each other.  However, we want to argue that many – if not all – of the events 
(e.g., having dinner) that we encounter contain interrelated details (e.g., cooking, washing the 
dishes). For forensically relevant events, such associations might exist as well.  Indeed, we 
agree with Holliday, Reyna, and Brainerd (2008, p. 76) who argued that “[f]alse memories 
induced by meaning related information embody several features of forensically relevant 
memories.  For child witnesses of domestic violence, for example, such violence is not 
usually a single episode but rather a series of repeated events that are substantially similar but 
not exactly the same.”  
What we want to stress here is that associative activation is likely to a play a role in 
repeated events where children have already developed a script of the event.  To provide an 
estimate of the number of legal cases in which children are interviewed about repeated events 
and hence, to have an idea of the number of cases in which reversal effects might occur, we 
examined verdicts of Dutch legal cases.  Specifically, in the Netherlands, one can access 
information (e.g., verdicts) concerning diverse cases via an online database 
(http://www.rechtspraak.nl).  To have a rough indication of cases on repeated experiences in 
children, we entered the following keywords as search terms: interview (in Dutch: 
studioverhoor) AND child (in Dutch: kind).  Furthermore, we filtered the data by only 
looking at cases in 2017.  Our search identified 38 cases.  Of those 38 cases, 29 (76%) were 
cases in which children were interviewed (age range: 5-17).  In these child interviewing 
cases, 18 (62%) cases concerned events that children experienced repeatedly, and 24 (83%) 
cases referred to sexual abuse cases.  Other cases in which children were interviewed 
involved domestic violence, the abduction of children, and witnesses to sexual behavior of 
the suspect.   
Our approximation here suggests the following. First, although repeated experiences 
of the same event can lead to the creation of false memories of related but not experienced 
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details in children involved in these cases, it is likely that the creation of such memory 
errors is less likely to occur in younger than older children. Second, this reversal effect is also 
likely to take place when these children are confronted with external suggestions that are 
linked to the repeated experience. The conclusions that we draw from these data should not 
be used to argue that younger children are –by definition- less suggestible than older children 
and adults. The central message should be that in situations involving for example scripts, the 
lack of knowledge in children might guard them from making spontaneous memory errors or 
going along with suggestions.1  
Of course, in actual cases, it might be difficult to decide whether children (or adults) 
had sufficient background knowledge of an event.  One option would be to examine whether 
the DRM paradigm would be a reliable and valid method in legal cases as a proxy for 
someone’s knowledge base.  If so, it could serve a similar function as the Gudjonsson 
Suggestibility Scale (e.g., Gudjonsson, 2003) which is oftentimes used in legal cases to have 
an indication if someone (eg., suspect) is likely to succumb to suggestive interviewing 
techniques.  However, although this might seem promising, recent research has failed to 
show any meaningful relations between false memories elicited by the DRM paradigm and 
false memories elicited by other paradigms (e.g., misinformation paradigm, false memory 
implantation; e.g., Otgaar & Candel, 2010; Patihis, Frenda, & Loftus, in press).  Hence, it is 
important to examine whether the DRM paradigm might be helpful in reversal effects in 
more realistic experiences.  
Concluding Remarks 
The long-standing, knee-jerk response concerning children’s lack of testimonial 
accuracy is incorrect.  Although widely believed to be true (Knutsson & Allwood, 2014), 
children do not necessarily show a heightened susceptibility to suggestion. For decades, 
preschoolers have been shown to be more suggestible than older children and adults (Bruck 
                                                
1 We want to thank Stephen Ceci for advising us to conduct this analysis on legal cases 
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& Ceci, 1999; Goodman & Reed, 1986). However, our argument here is that young 
children are not always the most suggestible, and in situations that rely on the activation of 
scripts, stereotypes, schemas, and other forms of connected meaning their lack of knowledge 
can sometimes protect them from external suggestions. That is, recent evidence shows that 
adults are sometimes at even greater risk of accepting suggestive information than children.  
The time is ripe to stop portraying children as inherently problematic eyewitnesses and 
acknowledge that they sometimes outperform adults, even when it comes to memory 
performance.  
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Overview of developmental studies on the misinformation effect showing age-
related decreases (younger children more suggestible than older children), age-related 
increases (older children more suggestible than older children) and no age differences 
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Appendix A 
The studies in this review were detected using four search engines (Web of Science, PubMed, ScienceDirect, and Google Scholar). We searched 
for experimental papers that were written in English and published after 1978. We selected this time frame as Ceci and Bruck (1993) reported 
that only very few methodologically sound papers had been published before 1978. The terms we employed for the literature search were: 
(children OR development) AND (suggestibility, misinformation, OR false memories). We also had several inclusion/exclusion criteria. We only 
incorporated experiments that introduced misinformation (e.g., via suggestive questions) following some sort of experienced event 
(misinformation paradigm). Also, we searched for papers that compared a minimum of two different age groups with at least one of them being a 
child group. 
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Developmental studies on the misinformation effect. 
Study Age (years) Event Form of 
misinformation 
Result 
Younger more 
suggestible 
than older 
Younger less 
suggestible 
than older 
No difference 
Cohen & Harnick 
(1980) 
9, 12, college 
students 
Video about 
petty crime 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
King & Yuille 
(1987) 
6, 9, 11, 16 Staged event Misleading 
questions 
x   
Ceci, Ross, & Toglia 
(1987), exp. 1 
3 - 12 Auditory story 
+ slides about a 
girl’s day at 
school (no 
crime) 
Misleading 
information 
x   
Ornstein, Gordon, Larus 
(1992) 
3, 6 Physical 
examination 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Oates & Shrimpton 
(1991) 
4 - 12 Blood 
collection, 
interaction with 
stranger 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Marin, Holmes, Guth, & Kovac 
(1979) 
5 - 22 Staged event 
(interaction 
between 
experimenters, 
no crime) 
Misleading 
questions 
  x (only one 
leading 
question) 
Duncan, Whitney, & Kunen  7, 9, 11, college Slides with Misleading  x  
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(1982), exp. 2 students short Star Wars 
episodes 
verbal 
information 
Flin, Boon, Knox, & Bull 
(1992) 
6, 10, adults Staged event 
(talk about foot 
hygiene, no 
crime) 
Misleading 
questions 
  x 
Rudy & Goodman 
(1991) 
4, 7 Interaction with 
stranger, 
watching 
interaction 
(playing board 
game) 
Misleading 
questions 
x actions that 
occurred 
 x overall 
Saywitz, Goodman, Nicholas, & 
Moan 
(1991) 
5, 7 Physical 
examination 
(genital and 
non-genital) 
Misleading 
questions 
x    
Perner & Wimmer 
(1988) 
2 - 4 Narrative about 
mother 
interacting with 
children (no 
crime) 
Embedded in 
narrative (only 
one item) 
x   
Ackil & Zaragoza 
(1995) 
7, 9, 11, college 
students 
Video about 
camp 
experiences (no 
crime) 
Embedded in 
narrative 
x   
Welch-Ross, Diecidue, & Miller 
(1997) 
3 - 5 Narrative about 
day of a girl 
Misleading 
questions 
x (4 min delay)  x (1 week 
delay) 
Hünefeldt, Rossi-Arnaud, & Furia 
(2009) 
4 - 7 Cartoon-video Misleading 
questions 
x    
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Hünefeldt, Lucidi, Furia, & Rossi-
Arnaud 
(2008) 
4 - 7 Cartoon-video Misleading 
questions 
x   
Kulkovsky & Klemfuss 
(2008) 
2 - 5 Staged event 
baking cookies 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Bright-Paul, Jarrold, & Wright 
(2008) 
3 - 7 Slide show 
about theft 
Embedded in 
narrative 
x   
Quas, Malloy, Melinder, 
Goodman, D’Mello, &Schaaf 
(2007) 
3, 5 Playing alone 
in laboratory 
Biased 
interviewer/ 
misleading 
questions 
x (misleading 
questions) 
x (only in free 
recall single 
interview , long 
delay) 
 
Roebers, Howie, & Beuscher 
(2007) 
6 - 8 Video about 
treasure hunt 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Melinder, Endestad, & 
Magnussen 
(2006) 
3, 6 Video showing 
children 
playing 
together 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Roebers & Schneider 
(2005) 
6, 7, 8, adults Video about 
treasure hunt 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Roebers, Gelhaar, & Schneider 
(2004) 
5 - 10 Staged event, 
video or slide 
show about 
visit of 
magician 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Alexander, Goodman, Schaaf, 
Edelstein, Quas, & Shaver 
(2002) 
3 - 7 Vaccination Misleading 
questions 
x   
Gobbo, Mega, & Pipe 
(2002), exp. 1 
3, 5 Participation, 
observation or 
Misleading 
questions 
x (immediate 
interview) 
 x (interview 1 
week later) 
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narration about 
playing with 
salt-dough 
Roebers & Schneider 
(2002) 
6, 8, 10 Video about 
money theft 
and treasure 
hunt 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Roebers, Bjorklund, Schneider, & 
Cassel 
(2002) 
5, 7, 10, adults Video about 
theft of a bike 
Misleading 
questions 
x   
Newcombe & Dour 
(2001) 
5, 6 Story 
accompanied 
by pictures 
about pet 
Embedded in 
narrative 
x   
Templeton & Wilcox 
(2000) 
3, 4, 6, adults Video showing 
Sesame Street 
Embedded in 
narrative 
x (original test)  x (modified 
test) 
Otgaar, Candel, Smeets, & 
Merckelbach 
(2010) 
4-5, 8-11 Instructed 
interaction with 
a puppet 
Erroneous 
feedback 
x (commission 
error) 
 x (omission 
error) 
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